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Methods to Model-Check Parallel Systems Software
by
Olga Shumsky Matlin, William McCune, and Ewing Lusk
Abstract
We report on an effort to develop methodologies for formal verification of parts of the Multi-
Purpose Daemon (MPD) parallel process management system. MPD is a distributed collection
of communicating processes. While the individual components of the collection execute simple
algorithms, their interaction leads to unexpected errors that are difficult to uncover by con-
ventional means. Two verification approaches are discussed here: the standard model checking
approach using the software model checker Spin and the nonstandard use of a general-purpose
first-order resolution-style theorem prover Otter to conduct the traditional state space explo-
ration. We compare modeling methodology and analyze performance and scalability of the two
methods with respect to verification of MPD.
1 Introduction
Reasoning about parallel programs is surprisingly difficult. Even small parallel programs are
difficult to write correctly, and an incorrect parallel program is equally difficult to debug, as we
experienced while writing the Multi-Purpose Daemon (MPD), a process manager for parallel
programs [2, 3]. Despite MPD’s small size and apparent simplicity, errors have impeded progress
toward code in which we have complete confidence. Such a situation motivates us to explore
program verification techniques.
MPD is itself a parallel program. Its function is to start the processes of a parallel job in a
scalable way, manage input and output, handle faults, provide services to the application, and
terminate jobs cleanly. MPD is the sort of process manager needed to run applications that
use the standard MPI [15, 16] library for parallelism, although it is not MPI specific. MPD is
distributed as part of the portable and publicly available MPICH [5, 6] implementation of MPI.
Our first attempt to use formal verification to ensure correctness of MPD algorithms [14]
employed the ACL2 [11] theorem prover, which allows one to both simulate and verify a model
within a single environment. Components of the MPD system, as well as the elements of
the Unix socket library on which MPD is based, were formalized in a subset of Lisp. The
formalization was based on a so-called oracle [17], which allows analysis of a parallel system in
a sequential environment. The oracle specifies an execution interleaving of concurrent processes
and is randomly generated for simulations. Verification is conducted with respect to an arbitrary
oracle (i.e., an arbitrary execution interleaving); thus, a property proved in such a way holds
for all possible executions of a collection of concurrent processes. In this approach parsing
simulation results, formulating desired properties of models of MPD algorithms and reasoning
about such models proved difficult, leading us to abandon this traditional theorem-proving
method of verification and to try instead model-checking techniques. Two such techniques are
described here.
The first technique employed the model checker Spin [7, 8], which supports design and
verification of asynchronous distributed communicating systems. Models of such systems are
recorded in the special high-level verification language Promela, which can also be used to
state some correctness properties of the models. Additional correctness properties are specified
by using linear temporal logic. The verification engine of Spin is based on on-the-fly reachability
analysis with several optimizations and heuristics, such as partial-order reduction and bitstate
hashing. The system also includes a simulation environment and a graphical user interface. Spin
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Figure 1: Daemons with console process, managers, and clients
has been used in various settings (see [20] for all of the proceedings of the Spin workshops).
Because the dynamic nature of MPD is easily expressible in the Spin/Promela framework,
the tool is a natural choice for verification of our system. However, our early experiences with
Spin [12] suggest that the most natural formalization of certain MPD algorithms in Promela
leads to performance and scalability challenges. While we have since addressed some of these
challenges, as described in Section 3, they led us to explore other ways to formalize and model
check MPD algorithms.
Specifically, because of considerable in-house theorem-proving expertise, we were led to ex-
plore whether a theorem prover can be successfully adapted for our purposes. We have used the
general-purpose first-order resolution and paramodulation theorem prover Otter [13]. While
the tool is widely used, its primary application is in proof search, mainly in mathematics and
logic. The input language is that of first-order logic. Otter does, however, contain extensions
for evaluable terms, which are essential to our unusual use of the theorem prover for state-space
exploration.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe MPD in more
detail and briefly present the algorithms, along with their correctness properties, for which the
verification approaches are evaluated. In Sections 3 and 4 we outline formalizations of the MPD
algorithms in Promela and the input language ofOtter. In Section 5 we compare and analyze
concrete results of specific verification experiments. We conclude with a summary in Section 6.
2 The Multi-Purpose Daemon
The MPD system comprises several types of processes. The daemons are persistent (may run
for weeks or months at a time, starting many jobs) and are connected in a ring. Manager
processes, started by the daemons to control the application processes (clients) of a single
parallel job, provide most of the MPD features and are also connected in a ring. A separate
set of managers supports an individual process environment for each user process. A console
process is an interface between a user and the daemon ring. A representative topology of the
MPD system is shown in Figure 1. The vertical solid lines represent connections based on
pipes; the remaining solid lines represent connections based on Unix sockets. The dashed and
dotted lines are potential or special-purpose connections.
Each of the daemon, manager, and console process types has essentially the same pattern of
behavior. This feature important because it allows us to model these processes in a consistent
manner. After initialization, the process enters an infinite, mostly idle, loop, implemented by
the Unix socket function select. When a message arrives on one of its sockets, the process calls
the appropriate message handler routine and reenters the idle select state. The handler does
a small amount of processing, creating new sockets or sending messages on existing ones. The
logic of the distributed algorithms executed by the system as a whole is contained primarily in
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Figure 2: Ring insertion
the handlers, and this is where the difficult bugs appear.
In the following we compare the two verification approaches on two algorithms: a daemon-
level ring establishment algorithm and a manager-level barrier algorithm. We present an outline
of each algorithm and highlights of the modeling approach.
2.1 Ring Establishment Algorithm
Establishment and maintenance of a ring of daemons are central to the operation of MPD.
Informally, daemon ring creation proceeds as follows. The initial daemon establishes a listening
port to which subsequent connections are made. The daemon connects to its own listening
port, creating a ring of one daemon. The listening port of the first daemon and the name
of the host processor are queried from the console. The desired number of daemons is then
initiated and directed to enter the ring by connecting to the first daemon. Figure 2 shows the
result of inserting a new daemon into an existing ring. After the insertion is completed, the old
connection between daemons on the right and left of the new daemon is disconnected (shown
in the figure by the dashed line). Note that in the special case of insertion into a ring of one
daemon, the daemon plays both the left and the right roles.
The algorithm may be viewed as consisting of two parts, each of which may potentially
contain errors. One part deals with establishment of listening ports and sockets to enable bidi-
rectional communication between processes. The second part concerns the passage of messages
over the established communication links and their handling upon receipt. Correct socket es-
tablishment depends to a large degree on the correct implementation of the Unix socket library.
The Promela and Otter models described below do not check correctness of this part of the
algorithm but rather concentrate on the correctness of passing messages between processors,
correctness of message handling, and correctness and consistency of the global system state.
Under this partitioning of the algorithm, and assuming that each processor records the iden-
tity of its right and left neighbors, the correctness property, stated as a postcondition, can be
formulated as follows.
The algorithm is correct for i daemons when, upon termination of the algorithm, the ring
has i distinct connected components and when, for any processors i and j in the ring, if the
right neighbor of i is j, then the left neighbor of j is i.
2.2 Barrier Algorithm
Parallel programs frequently rely on a barrier mechanism to ensure that all processes of the job
reach a certain point (complete initialization, for example) before any are allowed to proceed
further. Parallel jobs, that is, programs running on the clients, rely on the manager processes
to implement the barrier service. The algorithm proceeds as follows. A manager process is
designated as the leader of the algorithm and is given a rank of 0. When the leader reads a
request from its client to provide the barrier service, it sends a message barrier in to its right-
hand side neighbor in the ring. When a non-leader manager receives the barrier in message,
its behavior is determined by whether its client has already requested the barrier service. If
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the client has done so, the manager forwards the message to the right-hand side manager.
Otherwise, it holds the barrier in message until the request from the client arrives. While the
barrier in message is held, a bit variable holding barrier in is set. Once the barrier in
message traverses the entire manager ring and arrives back in the leader, meaning that each
client has reached the barrier and notified its manager, the leader sends a barrier out message
around the ring. When a manager receives the barrier out message, it notifies its client to
proceed past the barrier. The leader can be either the first or the last manager to allow its
client to proceed.
The barrier algorithm, as the ring establishment algorithm, can be viewed as consisting of
two parts: socket handling and message handling. Here, however, the socket handling portion
of the algorithm is largely unimportant to the verification effort, since the communication paths
between processes are completely established before the algorithm begins execution. The socket
portion may become important in future verification efforts that concentrate on interaction
of MPD algorithms and examine the barrier algorithm in conjunction with an algorithm that
manages — that is, establishes, breaks down, or restores after a fault — connections between
processes.
Two correctness properties, a postcondition and an invariant, are verified for the barrier
algorithm. The postcondition property is that all clients have been released from the barrier.
The invariant demands that no client be released until every client has reached the barrier, that
is, every client has requested the barrier service from its manager.
3 Formalization and Verification of MPD with Spin
To formalize an MPD algorithm in Promela, the modeling language of Spin, one has to
make three related decisions: what variables need be defined globally and locally to record the
necessary information during the execution of the algorithm, how to model the communication
network, and whether and how to model the Unix socket functions. When considered together,
the three modeling decisions determine how abstract the resulting model will be.
The original approach [12] to model checking MPD algorithms with Spin produced models
that were too literal, meaning that the Promela modeling language was used in a way that
closely resembled C. The motivation for such an approach was to enable automated extraction
of executable C code from verified Promela models. As a consequence of such a modeling
methodology it was possible to formalize within a single model both the socket-handling and
the message-handling portions of the MPD algorithms. Unfortunately, another consequence of
the approach was poor verification performance. We were able to verify the ring establishment
algorithm on only a few ( less than five) daemons, far short of the desired goal to verify models
with ten to twenty processors (see Section 5.3 for discussion of why verifying models of this
size would be interesting). During verification attempts on larger models, the number of states
in the search space was so large that Spin ran out of nearly 1 GB of available memory. The
current formalization approach produces more abstract models, which enables verification to
complete within the constraints of available memory on larger models, but at the expense of not
considering correctness of the socket-handling portion of the algorithms.
Components of the MPD system map naturally to predefined Promela entities: a proctype
is defined for each different MPD process type; individual daemon, manager, console, and client
processes correspond to active instances of the corresponding proctypes; sockets map to chan-
nels; and messages that are read and written over the sockets correspond to messages traveling
on the channels. The functionality of the Unix select [21] is implemented by the nondeter-
ministic do construct: when a message arrives in the input queue of a process instance, the
appropriate guard of the do construct triggers its handling; in the absence of new messages in
the input queue, the instance is blocked.
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The distinguishing characteristic of the Promela model of the barrier algorithm is that
the clients are not represented by separate process instances. To do otherwise would waste of
precious memory. In Spin, each process instance requires a certain amount of space in the
description of the entire system state, otherwise known as the state vector. The functional-
ity of a client is to send a request message to its manager and then wait for a reply. Both
these actions can be adequately modeled by two binary variables, client_barrier_in and
client_barrier_out, per manager process. We note that the algorithm depends on the fact
that a manager records whether it has already received a barrier request from its client, so one
of these variables is present in the model regardless of how clients are formalized. Omission
of clients reduces the complexity of the model and the size of the state vector in another way:
communication links between managers and clients are not necessary. Connections between
managers are the only communication links that have to be modeled. To this end we define a
global vector of N channels, where N is the number of managers in the model. Each manager
process has local pointers, left and right, to the appropriate channels in the global array. To
manage the bit variables, we rely on an implementation of bit arrays by Ruys [18], which defines
the IS 0 and SET 1 macros. The formalization ensures that the handler of a barrier request
message from the client is executed only once. The use of the do construct ensures that all
messages that arrive at the manager have equal precedence and can be handled in any order.
We show a partial Promela model of the barrier algorithm:
end_select:
do
:: IS_0(client_barrier_in,_pid) ->
SET_1(client_barrier_in,_pid);
/* remainder of client request handling */
:: left?barrier_in ->
/* barrier_in handling */
:: left?barrier_out ->
/* remainder barrier_out handling */
SET_1(client_barrier_out,_pid);
if
:: _pid == 0 -> skip
:: else -> right!barrier_out
fi;
od
The socket-based communication network presented the most challenges in the formalization
of the ring establishment algorithm. Unlike the static topology of the communication links in
the barrier algorithm, the topology of connections in the ring algorithm is dynamic. As daemons
enter the ring, new connections are established, and the old ones are broken down, as illustrated
in Figure 2. In addition, because all execution interleavings are exhaustively considered during
the model search, the network has to be set up so that any two processes can communicate
with each other. Numerous different formalizations of the communication network were tried
in our effort to verify a model of meaningful size. In particular, we tried the bus and matrix of
channels formalizations, as suggested in [19].
Our experiments showed that, with respect to verification, the best approach to modeling
the communication network of the ring establishment algorithm depends on a vector of global
channels. Each daemon process owns a channel, which serves as an input queue for any messages
addressed to that process. In order to further reduce complexity, as suggested by Spin’s docu-
mentation, each daemon retains exclusive rights, by using the xr designation, to read from its
owned channel. In this approach, illustrated in Figure 3, a single input queue is used by a node
to receive messages from all nodes, but different queues are used to send messages addressed
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daemon
Figure 3: Model for message sending and receiving
to different nodes. We find it interesting that this approach is explicitly advised against in the
Spin help file: to reduce complexity, the documentation suggests one “avoid sharing channels
between multiple receivers or multiple senders.” This approach nonetheless succeeds in our
model because, while the network is set up to allow sharing channels between multiple senders,
most communications take place between distinct pairs of daemons, so channel sharing very
rarely occurs during exploration of a single execution path. Thus, the complexity of the model
is not adversely affected.
4 Formalization and Verification of MPD with Otter
Otter [13] is an automated theorem-proving system for first-order logic with equality. Most
successful applications of Otter have been in abstract algebra and logic, and its strength is the
ability to quickly explore large search spaces. It can efficiently manage large sets of formulas
(hundreds of thousands), which allows it to automatically prove many difficult theorems.
Otter’s basic operations are (1) to apply various inference rules to formulas, (2) to apply
rewrite rules to inferred formulas, and (3) to determine whether newly inferred formulas are
already in the database of formulas. These operations can be applied to state space searches as
well as to the heuristic searches used in traditional automated theorem proving.
Program verification is a nonstandard application of Otter. Fortunately, Otter’s lan-
guage, data structures, and operations allow reasonably intuitive and efficient implementations
of model checking by state space search. One of the languages Otter accepts is a sequent
language with which we can write rules, assertions, and goals as follows.
hypothesis
1
, · · · , hypothesis
n
−→conclusion.
−→assertion.
goal−→.
Given an input consisting of statements of this type,Otter can apply the rules to the assertions,
generating new assertions, and so on, until it derives one of the goals or until reaches a fixed
point (i.e., runs out of things to do). All of the assertions (initial and derived) are stored in the
database.
A feature of Otter that allows it to conduct an efficient state-space search is the ability to
evaluate hypotheses by rewriting, as well as to match the hypotheses with assertions. For ex-
ample, the hypotheses X == 3, where X is instantiated by a preceding hypothesis, is evaluated
to a Boolean value. The rewrite mechanism includes a simple but general equational program-
ming language so that the evaluable hypotheses can be arbitrary function calls. In addition, the
conclusion of the rule can have function calls to transform the result.
One can use this mechanism to implement a state space search in a straightforward way.
The initial states are initial assertions (usually there is just one), say,
−→State(s0),
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where s0 is a data structure representing the initial state. The rules take states to successor
states,
State(S),P(S)−→State(f(S)),
where P(S) are evaluable hypotheses specifying the states to which the rule applies, and f(S)
generates the successor state.
When applying this method to model-checking concurrent computations, one frequently
needs the hypothesis “Let N be an arbitrary process.” To implement this capability, we include
initial assertions giving the set of process IDs, say, for a three-processor simulation,
−→PID(0).
−→PID(1).
−→PID(2).
Then, the rules can be given as
State(S),PID(N),P(S,N)−→State(f(S,N)).
In its basic form, the Otter search mechanism is designed to be complete; that is, if a
conjecture is a theorem, then Otter will eventually find a proof. (In the practice of tradi-
tional automated theorem proving, restrictions are frequently imposed by the user, resulting in
incomplete search procedures.) In the context of state space search, this completeness means
that (given enough time and memory) all states that can be reached from the initial states will
eventually be derived and stored by Otter.
To determine whether an illegal state can be reached, one can include a rule such as
State(S),P(S)−→Bad State(S)
and the goal
Bad State(S)−→,
with the effect that if any illegal state is derived, Otter will report it and print the path of
states from an initial state to the illegal one. From Otter’s point of view, it has simply found
and printed a proof of a goal. From the point of view of verification, the path of states represents
an erroneous execution scenario. The Otter proof of the reachability of an illegal state can
be examined to determine which state transition rule leads to the error. If Otter reaches a
fixed point without deriving an illegal state, the terminal states or the entire state space can be
examined and processed by the user or by another system.
We show a partial three-element Otter model of the barrier algorithm:
%
-> PID(0).
-> PID(1).
-> PID(2).
%
-> State(PS(0,0,0,[]),PS(0,0,0,[]),PS(0,0,0,[])).
%
State(S), PID(X), X == 0, $TRUE(barrier_out_arrived(S,X)) ->
State(assign_client_return(receive_message(S,X),X,1)).
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State(S), PID(X), X != 0, $TRUE(barrier_out_arrived(S,X)) ->
State(assign_client_return(send_message
(receive_message(S,X),next(X),barrier_out),X,1)).
%
-> barrier_out_arrived([],I) = false.
-> barrier_out_arrived([PS(CLI_IN,CLI_OUT,MSG,Q)|T],I) =
$IF(I == 0,
first(Q) == barrier _out,
barrier_out_arrived(T,I-1)).
-> assign_client_return([],I,V) = [].
-> assign_client_return([PS(CLI_IN,CLI_OUT,MSG,Q)|T],I,V) =
$IF(I == 0,
[PS(CLI_IN,V,MSG,Q)|T],
[PS(CLI_IN,CLI_OUT,MSG,Q)|assign_client_return(T,I-1,V)]).
-> dequeue([]) = [].
-> dequeue([H|T]) = T.
-> receive_message([],I) = [].
-> receive_message([PS(CLI_IN,CLI_OUT,MSG,Q)|T],I) =
$IF(I == 0,
[PS(CLI_IN,CLI_OUT,MSG,dequeue(Q))|T],
[PS(CLI_IN,CLI_OUT,MSG,Q)|receive_message(T,I-1)]).
The model is based on the same simplification as the Promela model of the algorithm:
clients are not explicitly represented. A valid system state consists of three process states. Each
process state PS is a 4-tuple, whose every element implicitly corresponds to either one of the
variables used by the algorithm or the input queue. In this model the process state template is
PS[client_barrier_in, client_barrier_out,
holding_barrier_in, input_queue].
In the initial state of each process, every variable has a zero value, and the input queue is
empty. The two transition rules correspond to the handling operations for the barrier_out
message, as also shown in the Promela model above. The rules are applicable when the client
barrier requests have been received by all processes, that is, the client_barrier_in bit has
been set by every process, any holding_barrier_in bits that might have been set are again
reset. In this formalization, the manager with 0 rank is the last to release its client, so the state
of the system to which the first of the two state transition rules applies is
(PS[1,0,0,(barrier_out)],
PS[1,1,0,[]],
PS[1,1,0,[]]),
and the result of the application of the rule, including evaluation of the functions assign_cli-
ent_return to assign the value of the client_barrier_outbit and receive_message to remove
a message from the input queue, is the overall system state
(PS[1,1,0,[]],
PS[1,1,0,[]],
PS[1,1,0,[]]).
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Formalization of MPD algorithms in the sequent language of Otter is similar to formaliza-
tions in the input language of the Murφ model checker, especially as presented in the simplified
form in [9]. Similarities are most evident in the definition of state transition rules.
5 Results and Comparisons
At this point in the project the goal is to discover whether existing tools and methodologies can
be used for verification of MPD algorithms. We are also interested in developing formalization
techniques that simultaneously produce models abstract enough to allow us to verify models
of meaningful size and detailed enough to enable automated model construction and/or code
generation. We apply verification approaches to MPD algorithms that have been developed
some time ago, and are well understood and well debugged. That is, bug hunting is currently
only a secondary goal. (We have nonetheless found a minor error in the ring insertion algorithm
using the literal formalization of our earlier approach to using Spin.) Rather, we are interested
in developing an arsenal of verification techniques to use for the analysis of the recent and future
MPD algorithms. Therefore, criteria for evaluation of verification methods include the ease of
modeling, correlation of the model to the design and/or implementation of the MPD algorithm,
and verification performance.
5.1 Comparison of Formalizations
The Spin/Promela approach is the more natural one for the MPD application, but the Otter
approach does offer some, albeit possibly subjective, advantages.
Spin and its input language Promela are specifically developed for verification of concur-
rent communicating processes. Therefore, the language and the tool include special built-in
constructs and algorithms for message handling, communication path definition, and variable
declaration and manipulation. As a result, there is a natural mapping between MPD com-
ponents and Promela entities. By contrast, Otter, as a general-purpose tool, has to be
programmed from scratch to handle these common operations of MPD algorithms. Although,
once constructed, this auxiliary portion of the Otter model can be reused, the Spin models
are much more concise, as demonstrated by the model extracts above.
From our point of view, the ability to model an algorithm as a set of state transition rules is
the main advantage of theOtter approach. The set of rules, which is the main component of the
Otter model, can be easily extracted from a flow chart representation of the MPD algorithms
or from other notations typically used in the early stages of algorithm design. Construction
of Promela models looks and feels much more like constructing another implementation of
the algorithm, only using a language much less powerful than C or Python, which are used for
actual implementations. Furthermore, all intermediate states produced by the Otter search
are transparent to the user and can be examined. Such examination is not possible in Spin and
may be a limitation when trying to understand a particularly complicated error trace.
Correctness properties of Otter models of MPD algorithms have to be formulated within
the confines of first-order logic. Spin, on the other hand, allows one to record correctness
properties in linear temporal logic. Although we have not yet encountered a situation where
limitations of first order logic prevented us from stating the desired correctness property, such
a situation is conceivable and may prove a disqualifying drawback of the Otter approach.
5.2 Performance Comparison
All verification runs were conducted on a 933 MHz Pentium III processor with 970 MB of usable
RAM. We used default Spin settings for all verification attempts, except when we increased the
memory limit to allow the search to complete. In cases where verification did not complete with
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Table 1: Verification statistics
Model Time Memory States States
Problem Method Size (s) (MB) Stored Matched
Unordered ring Otter 7 3979.08 391 7.83654e+05 1.908330e+06
Spin 7 30.32 375 2.27008e+06 1.90833e+06
Ordered ring Otter 14 15676 561 1.028351e+06 6.318042e+06
Spin 14 263.68 734 6.50332e+06 8.66146e+06
Barrier Otter 19 27082 512 1.048593e+06 8.912898e+06
Spin 21 2045 746 8.38865e+06 8.38861e+07
default parameters within physical memory limits, verification with compression (using Spin’s
-DCOLLAPSE compile-time directive) was performed. The input files for the Otter experiments
included settings to optimize the state space exploration. Some default flags that are usually
needed in standard Otter experiments but irrelevant for our application were turned off.
Table 1 shows performance statistics of applying Spin and Otter to three problems. Two
problems are variants of the ring insertion algorithm. In both versions the first daemon estab-
lishes a singleton ring. In the unordered version the subsequent daemons may enter the ring
in any order, resulting in many possible final topologies with respect to the relative position of
the processors in the ring, and hence a much greater state search space and poorer verification
performance. In the ordered version, the order in which the processes enter the ring is fixed,
resulting in a single possible final topology. In essence, the difference between the two versions
is that in the unordered case the daemons are numbered before they begin to enter the ring,
whereas in the ordered case they are numbered after they have done so. As a result, in the
ordered case, the processor that enters the ring first is always numbered with one, the processor
that is second, with two, and so on. Because the algorithm is independent of the identities of
the processors, the ordered version is less complex.
Table 1 shows statistics for the largest model sizes on which a particular verification approach
succeeded. On complex algorithms, such as ring insertion, Otter matches Spin with respect to
the largest verifiable model. In terms of speed and memory usage per examined state, Otter is
far behind Spin. This result is not surprising because Spin is a special-purpose tool, specifically
designed for applications like ours, while our use of Otter is unusual in this case. In fact, the
performance of Otter far exceeded our expectations.
Otter could not verify models of as many processors as Spin could for thr barrier algorithm.
The explanation for such a difference in performance lies in the way states are represented in
each method. In Spin, the three local variables that contribute to individual process states are
bits, and the communications channels are essentially arrays of bits, which allows Spin to store
state vectors very efficiently. In addition, in the Spin verification run on a model of twenty-
one processors, state vectors were compressed, resulting in further improved performance. In
Otter, the variables and the input queue are terms, which are not stored as efficiently as bits.
Thus, Otter requires much more memory to store an individual system state. As a result,
Otter is able to examine a much smaller state spaces.
The Otter search engine is not optimized for the kind of search that takes place in this ap-
plication. It is therefore not surprising that verification with Otter is several times slower than
with Spin. But, since memory, not time, is the main limitation in this application specifically
and in model checking in general, the speed of verification is only of minor concern.
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5.3 A Note on Model Sizes
Scalability was one of the design goals of MPD. The daemon is intended to run on hundreds,
and eventually on thousands, of processors. Unexpected limitations of the underlying operating
systems aside, it is assumed that the same algorithms that execute successfully in a daemon of
just a few processors will execute smoothly in a much larger system. Given the current state of
the model-checking technology, it is impossible to formally verify the algorithms of MPD on very
large models sizes, even if it were desirable to do so. Luckily, the empirical evidence obtained
while debugging the MPD code using the traditional means suggests that the errors, even the
most difficult and obscure ones, exhibit themselves in daemons of just a few processors. It also
appears to be an accepted view of the model-checking community that to verify systems with
unbounded potential number of elements, it is sufficient to verify a limited( with respect to the
number of elements) model of the system [1, 4, 10].
Our goal is to devise a verification approach and a modeling methodology that allows us to
verify complex MPD algorithms and interactions of these algorithms on models of ten to twenty
daemons. For example, MPD contains an algorithm that merges two daemons that are running
parallel jobs. We want to verify the algorithm on a meaningful model consisting of two MPD
structures, as shown in Figure 1, each having a console process and three of each of daemon,
manager, and client processes.
6 Summary
We described here two approaches to verification of the algorithms of the parallel process man-
agement system called MPD. One approach is based on the software model checker Spin, the
other on the general-purpose first-order theorem prover Otter. Both approaches are based
on model checking, and the use of Otter in the model checking-capacity is unusual. The aim
was to model algorithms of MPD in both the Spin and the Otter approaches so as to enable
verification of the largest possible model.
The two approaches were compared with respect to the ease of formalization and verifica-
tion performance characteristics. Overall, Spin is more efficient in terms of absolute time and
memory requirements and relative time and memory requirements per stored system state. In
terms of the size of models that each approach allows us to verify, both tools perform roughly
the same, with Spin occasionally demonstrating better performance. Neither approach allows
us to verify complicated algorithms on models of about twenty daemons, which is our goal. In
terms of formalization methodology, the two approaches are too different to compare, and both
exhibit advantages and disadvantages.
The main goal of this technical note is to document the current approach to modeling MPD
in Promela, and to describe how Otter can be used to simulate model-checking style search.
We have been applying model checking techniques to MPD algorithms that have been under
development and testing for some time. Consequently, it should come as no surprise that no
errors have been discovered. Even though the current modeling methodologies limit verification
to models of only a few entities, applying them to new MPD algorithms could still be beneficial.
For further details the reader is referred to the complete models of the presented algorithms.
This information is available at http://www.mcs.anl.gov/~matlin/spin-mpd.
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